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To understand the neurobiology of indi-
vidual differences in approach and avoid-
ance behavior, we must anchor constructs
at the behavioral level to the long-term
global sensitivities of the neural systems
that give rise to the observed stable pat-
terns of behavior. We will argue that this
requires not only appropriate data at both
the neural and behavioral levels but also
appropriate account to be taken of inter-
actions at the intervening level of the
conceptual nervous system (Hebb, 1949;
Gray, 1975). In particular, in accounting
for approach and avoidance behavior we
must include consideration of the distinc-
tion between valuation and motivation
(Corr and McNaughton, 2012), of inter-
actions between the approach system and
the avoidance system (Gray and Smith,
1969), and of their interaction with a dis-
tinct additional system that is activated by
approach-avoidance conflict (Gray, 1977;
summarized in Corr, 2013).
But first we need to ask why would we
expect there to be traits linked to global
approach and avoidance systems? Simple
animals (with little or no brain) can pro-
duce approach and avoidance behavior
(toward benefits and ultimately reproduc-
tion; and away from dangers and ulti-
mately failure to reproduce) via multiple
independent rules of thumb (Krebs et al.,
1983). But we can expect more com-
plex brains to have largely integrated these
simple elements into systems more gen-
erally dedicated to approach or avoid-
ance “because this is how [a few] genes
can build a complex system that will
produce appropriate but flexible behav-
ior to increase fitness. . . . Rather than
just pre-programmed movements such as
tropisms and taxes, . . . if the genes are effi-
ciently to control behavior . . . they must
specify the goals for action” (Rolls, 2000,
pp. 183, 190). Together with the evolution
of general approach and avoidance systems
that are not tied to any specific motivat-
ing stimulus (reinforcer), we would expect
evolution of the long-term adaptive con-
trol of their overall sensitivity to adequate
inputs. Such stable sensitivity would be
the neurobiological basis of approach and
avoidance personality traits.
Determining the appropriate neurobi-
ological measure for the sensitivity of a
highly evolved approach or avoidance sys-
tem is not simple. These systems have
hierarchically organized neural levels with
processing ranging from “quick and dirty”
to “slow and sophisticated” for both
perception (LeDoux, 1994) and action
(Graeff, 1994, 2010). Sensitivity to input
determines which level of the system is
activated and so sensitivity cannot reside
in any one of the modules within the sys-
tem (McNaughton and Corr, 2004). The
source of any sensitivity must, therefore,
be identified independently—in essence
requiring at least a preliminary surface
level description of traits.
Existing theories of personality pro-
vide a number of competing surface level,
lexically-derived, systems with trait mea-
sures that relate to approach and avoid-
ance either indirectly via constructs such
as Extraversion and Neuroticism (Eysenck,
1957) or directly via constructs such
as Harm Avoidance (Cloninger et al.,
1993). Each system is stable, with links
to mental disorder (Strelau and Zawadzki,
2011; Gomez et al., 2012; Mullins-Sweatt
and Lengel, 2012; Trull, 2012) and brain
structure (Gardini et al., 2009; DeYoung
et al., 2010). But even when starting with
approach and avoidance as primary con-
structs, they are derived “top-down” from
pools of lexically-chosen questionnaire
items (Carver and White, 1994; Elliot and
Thrash, 2010) not from biological anchors.
They also depend on factor analysis, which
determines the number of dimensions, but
not location of trait axes of the person-
ality “space” that items occupy (Lykken,
1971; Corr and McNaughton, 2008). It is
little more than an act of faith to believe
that the causal structure of personality is
isomorphic with its lexical factor struc-
ture. So, even if we knew for certain that
there were only two dimensions within a
particular measured personality space, one
questionnaire system could have a single
simple trait anxiety dimension (orthogo-
nal to, say, impulsiveness) that was a com-
bination of neuroticism and introversion
in another (Gray, 1970)—the two systems
differing only on which items from an
original pool were used to create scales.
Factor analytically derived trait measures
can also easily meet the criterion of hav-
ing “simple structure” (in the sense that
a set of items loads highly on only one
factor so factors can be clearly identified
by unique item loadings) while imply-
ing improbable causation (Lykken, 1971).
Further, not only is there no reason to
suppose that biologically accurate scales
should have simple structure but also cur-
rent scale systems, even though designed
to have this, often do not (DeYoung, 2006,
2010).
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The plethora of competing trait scales
can to some extent be encompassed by just
five major trait dimensions that include
both normal people and those with psy-
chiatric disorders (Markon et al., 2005;
Revelle et al., 2011; Krueger et al., 2012).
However, the traits of the competing sys-
tems have complex relations to these five
large scale dimensions and it is open to
question whether there are five funda-
mental dimensions or whether these are
complex facets riding on two or even
just one major dimension of personality
(Markon et al., 2005; DeYoung et al., 2007;
Rushton and Irwing, 2009). These large
scale dimensions have “facets” that poten-
tially represent the true underlying sources
of personality; and different “approaches
differ substantially in the number and
nature of the facets they propose, indicat-
ing that further conceptual and empirical
work is needed to achieve a consen-
sual specification of the Big Five factors
at lower levels of abstraction. [Further],
given that the Big Five were derived ini-
tially from analyses of the personality lex-
icon, one might wonder whether they
merely represent linguistic artifacts” (John
et al., 2008, p 141). With no “bottom
up” neural anchor to definitely locate the
correct rotation of any true biological
trait/facet axis, there is no unequivocal
way to unify the various systems currently
in use.
A related problem, on which we focus
below, is that the bulk of personality
research has required statistical indepen-
dence (orthogonality) of the extracted
factors. To do otherwise would greatly
increase the already large number of alter-
native trait solutions for any particular
item space. However, as we will see, there is
good reason to see surface level behavior as
being determined interactively even if the
biological control of the underlying sen-
sitivities is independent. Likewise, even if
the control of factors is neurally indepen-
dent, when one, e.g., neuroticism, is a risk
factor for another, e.g., anxiety (Andrews
et al., 1990), then they will become statis-
tically linked in the population as a result.
The solution for approach/avoidance
traits is to anchor their factor spaces to
measures derived from existing neural
state theory. Figure 1 is derived from
one particular detailed neuropsycho-
logical theory (Gray and Smith, 1969;
FIGURE 1 | Overall relation of approach (BAS), avoidance (FFFS = fight, freeze, flee), and
conflict (BIS = behavioral inhibition) systems—an updated model. The inputs to the system
are classified in terms of the delivery (+) or omission (−) of primary positive reinforcers (PosR) or
primary negative reinforcers (NegR) or conditional stimuli (CS) or innate stimuli (IS) that predict such
primary events. The BIS is activated when it detects approach-avoidance conflict—suppressing
prepotent responses and eliciting risk assessment and displacement behaviors. The systems
interact in a variety of ways to generate behavior, see text. The shaded areas are all points at which
traits appear to operate. Figure and legend modified from Gray and McNaughton (2000) and Corr
and McNaughton (2012).
Gray, 1982; Gray and McNaughton,
2000; McNaughton and Corr, 2004;
Corr and McNaughton, 2012) but its
system level description captures issues
that must be taken into account by any
approach/avoidance account of personal-
ity. Adequate stimuli (reinforcers) must
first be valued and, importantly, nega-
tive stimuli (e.g., losses) have a higher
exchange rate that positive ones (e.g.,
gains); that is, people usually show loss
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Any specific positive or negative rein-
forcer can produce approach or avoidance
depending on its contingency (presenta-
tion or omission) with responding. For
any given reinforcer, the motivational sen-
sitivity of approach activation is differ-
ent from avoidance activation; and these
are separate from the distinct valuation
sensitivities of gain to loss (Hall et al.,
2011). The strength of response output for
any given level of approach activation also
depends on distance from the goal (not
shown in Figure 1) and does so to a lesser
extent than does avoidance (Miller, 1944).
Even with independent trait sensitiv-
ities, state approach output depends on
the level of avoidance activation, and
vice versa: their activations sum to gen-
erate arousal, while subtracting to deter-
mine choice—giving rise to phenomena
such as behavioral contrast and peak shift
(Gray and Smith, 1969). As a result, when
approach and avoidance are strongly and
equally activated, arousal is high but the
probability of both approach and avoid-
ance is low; in addition, the approach-
avoidance conflict is detected by a third
system (with its own trait sensitivity) that
is unlike either pure approach or pure
avoidance (withdrawal) in being affected
by anxiolytic drugs (Gray, 1977). Both
approach and avoidance are then inhib-
ited and replaced by behaviors such as risk
assessment (Gray and McNaughton, 2000)
and displacement (Hinde, 1998), while
arousal and negative bias (risk aversion)
are increased. With this plethora of inter-
actions, it will be difficult to extract true
approach and avoidance traits from the
surface structure of behavior—especially
if orthogonal factors such as gain and
approach have been conflated in a sin-
gle construct such as reward (Corr and
McNaughton, 2012).
However, neural measures should be
able to target the internal representa-
tions of the specific elements depicted
in Figure 1; challenge their response with
appropriate combinations of stimuli; and
so dissect out the specific contribution of
a particular trait sensitivity. These neu-
ral measures can then be used to anchor
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traits within the conventional factor spaces
and determine non-orthogonalities.
Paradoxically, we are closest to achiev-
ing this with the most embedded neural
construct: sensitivity to conflict. The argu-
ment for the use of primarily neural
rather than questionnaire measures of
approach and avoidance sensitivities has
been made in detail previously—coupled
with arguments for combining bottom
up neural analysis with top down behav-
ioral analysis (Smillie, 2008a,b; DeYoung,
2010). Here, we would emphasize, in addi-
tion, that the choice of neural measures
should be strongly theoretically based
and behaviorally and or pharmacologi-
cally validated in relation to the theory.
Otherwise a plethora of questionnaires
becomes a plethora of putative neural
measures.
The conflict system is defined by the
action of anxiolytic drugs (Gray, 1977)
acting on receptors for endogenous com-
pounds (Guidotti et al., 1978; Polc, 1995)
that could mediate the system’s trait sen-
sitivity. Anxiolytic action is specifically
linked to hippocampal rhythmicity in
rodents (Woodnorth and McNaughton,
2002; McNaughton et al., 2006, 2007) and
this has led to development of a human
scalp EEG homolog (McNaughton et al.,
2013) that provides a biomarker for con-
flict sensitivity in humans. This biomarker
appears to be linked to the shared vari-
ance in neuroticism and trait anxietymuch
more than either of their unique variances
(Neo et al., 2011).
In summary, we believe that approach
and avoidance systems have evolved in
such a way that global control of sen-
sitivities to gain, loss, approach, avoid-
ance and conflict can underlie human
personality traits (Corr and McNaughton,
2012). While each of these long-term sen-
sitivities is likely to be controlled inde-
pendently, under normal ecological cir-
cumstances short-term behavioral output
will be the result of complex interac-
tions between them (Figure 1). However,
the combination of appropriate neural
measures with designs that dissect these
interactions should provide the means
to anchor trait measures in the data
spaces that personality research has already
shown have long term stability and impor-
tant behavioral, and particularly psychi-
atric, consequences. Critically, the factor
analysis of lexically-derived variables at
the surface level of description cannot be
assumed to reflect the deeper construct
processes that are giving rise to surface
descriptions; and no adjustment of the
basic factor analysis method can avoid the
problem created when there is no neural
anchor to ensure inclusion of correct items
and unique rotational solution after initial
factoring.
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